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Abstract
Deceptive defense techniques (e.g., intrusion
detection, firewalls, honeypots, honeynets) are
commonly used to prevent cyberattacks. However,
most current defense techniques are generic and static,
and are often learned and exploited by attackers. It
is important to advance from static to dynamic forms
of defense that can actively adapt a defense strategy
according to the actions taken by individual attackers
during an active attack. Our novel research approach
relies on cognitive models and experimental games:
Cognitive models aim at replicating an attacker’s
behavior allowing the creation of personalized,
dynamic deceptive defense strategies; experimental
games help study human actions, calibrate cognitive
models, and validate deceptive strategies. In this paper
we offer the following contributions: (i) a general
research framework for the design of dynamic, adaptive
and personalized deception strategies for cyberdefense;
(ii) a summary of major insights from experiments
and cognitive models developed for security games of
increased complexity; and (iii) a taxonomy of potential
deception strategies derived from our research program
so far.

1.

Introduction

Cyberattacks fundamentally occur by taking
advantage of the power of deception—the act of
intentionally inducing and suppressing signals to cause
behavioral changes in a target to benefit the deceiver [1].
Through the years, attackers have perfected their use of
deception by taking advantage of the ease with which it
is possible to conceal their identities, their actions, and
their intentions in cyberspace. Furthermore, attackers
have become experts in their use of social engineering
—psychological manipulations to trick people into
disclosing sensitive information or unlawfully granting
access to a secure system [2]. However, deception has
also been used as a defense strategy benefiting defenders
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and attackers alike [3]. For example, common deception
strategies used in cyberdefense include: masking and
decoying [4, 5]. Masking is a technique of making
a real object undetectable; used to hide information
behind benign programs (e.g., hiding information
behind an image in an email message) while decoying
presents a false object to grab attention by showcasing
fake but relevant information (e.g., honeypots may
grab an attacker’s attention by showcasing essential
data that is of value to the attacker). Mechanisms
such as honeypots—a fake system that is valuable by
being attacked—have been used extensively to secure
information, stop and detect spam, and enhance network
defense [6]. Honeypots are used for detection to catch
illicit interactions; in prevention, to assist in slowing
attackers down; and many other defense possibilities
[7]. However, the effectiveness of honeypot techniques
is questionable, as they often rely on static allocations
that can often be easily discovered by attackers.
A successful approach to address the optimal
allocation of defense resources relies on optimization
solutions that use game theoretic models and in
particular Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) [8, 9]. As
we will discuss below, these solutions have proven to be
effective in a large number of physical security cases;
and although they have not been practically applied to
cybersecurity, work is underway to address this gap [8].
Our research program on cyberdeception contributes
to addressing this gap by investigating the use
of deceptive signals and their interaction with the
allocation of defense resources through SSGs in the
context of cybersecurity. Finding the right balance of
deceptive signals so that the attacker continues to believe
the signal is crucial to the success of deceptive strategies
[10]. Our research program aims at advancing our
understanding of how deceptive signals can be designed
and presented to attackers in order to maximize their
effectiveness.
As we discuss in the following sections, fundamental
to the success of a dynamic and personalized
deception strategy is the integration of computational
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representations of human behavior with the optimization
solutions for SSGs.
Designing effective defense
algorithms must make use of the knowledge of human
behavior: the way humans make decisions, how they
explore an environment, how they take risks, and how
they use their experience. Insights on human behavior
often emerge from laboratory experiments where we can
study would-be attackers. This behavior is then captured
by theoretically grounded cognitive models that explain
the dynamics of human behavior in computational forms
to predict the actions of a human attacker. Cognitive
models are important given that human behavior is
often far different from what is predicted under the
assumptions of perfect rationality models [11, 12]. Our
recent findings indicate that signaling algorithms, while
optimized for perfectly rational adversaries do improve
defense compared to not signaling at all, are less
effective than expected for boundedly rational humans
[10, 13]. Therefore, the study of human behavior in
experiments and the computational representation of
their decision process is essential to advance current
deception strategies of defense.

1.1.

Deception as a Defense Strategy: Use of
Game Theory and Signaling in
Cybersecurity

Researchers of the broad field of security have
addressed the important question of how to assign
limited defense resources to potential targets, by using
SSGs and game theoretic optimal solutions. SSGs
have two players, the defender and the attacker; a
defender must defend a set of targets using a limited
number of resources, whereas the attacker is able to
observe and learn the defenders strategy and attack after
surveillance. A defender commits to a mixed strategy
(e.g., how to allocate defense resources), and then the
attacker conducts surveillance of these mixed strategies
and responds with an attack on a target that optimizes
her reward [8]. The objective in this line of research is
to find an optimal mixed strategy for the defender (i.e.,
an optimal allocation of defense resources), called the
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) [8, 9].
This work has led to an impressive set of practical
cases of the theoretical insights from the SSE [8]. Cases
include: the allocation of canine patrols and vehicle
checkpoints at LAX [14], as well as the allocation of
rangers over National Parks to protect wildlife from
poachers [15].
Although the insights of SSGs research have
not been practically applied to Cybersecurity this
research is underway [16, 17]. Researchers have
aimed at advancing the insights from physical

security to cybersecurity [18] by creating interactive
”security games” through which strategies of the
defender can be paired against humans acting as
attackers. These human-in-the-loop security games are
abstract representations of the essential elements of
cybersecurity, often used in laboratory experiments in
order to understand human attackers’ behavior against
particular defense strategies [15, 19, 20].
Interactive security games are helpful to investigate
cyberdeception given the limitations of the theoretical
insights of SSGs to practical cybersecurity applications.
In contrast to physical security, cybersecurity is a
complex context that challenges current SSG research
and the SSE strategy computations [8]. Cybersecurity
is a more dynamic and complex context compared to
any physical security problem. A computer network,
and the targets that a defender must protect, can change
dynamically. This is a problem with current SSE
calculations, as an optimal strategy must be recomputed
in real-time. Furthermore, the common assumption
in SSE that adversaries know and are able to survey
among the defense mixed strategies is unreasonable
in cybersecurity. In the cyberworld, the adversaries
know little about the defense strategies and similarly
the defender has little information about the possible
attackers’ actions.
Given the importance of deception and the multiple
challenges in applying SSGs directly to naturalistic
cybersecurity problems, researchers have focused on
the investigation of signaling strategies [11, 21]
with the use of interactive simulations in human
experiments. In order to test the effectiveness of these
algorithms, researchers compare their results against
human attackers’ actions in laboratory experiments
[11].
In this new line of research, signaling is
investigated in conjunction with the SSGs and SSE. The
strategic exploitation of information by the defender
can influence and deceive the adversary, and this is
formalized by incorporating a signaling game model
into the SSGs, where the defender strategically reveals
information about a defensive strategy to the attacker,
in order to influence the attackers decision making [16].
Signaling appears to improve the defender utility against
a perfectly rational attacker compared to the traditional
SSE model without signaling, but more research is
needed to understand the use of deceptive signaling as
a proactive mechanism of defense.
Various forms of signaling have been proposed
to increase a human attacker’s compliance with
signals [17], but much remains to be investigated
regarding how humans process and act according
to such signals.
Our recent research shows that
humans behave far differently than predicted under
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Figure 1. A Research Framework for Dynamic, Adaptive, and Personalized Defense Strategies

the assumption of perfect rationality [17]; humans
exhibit nominally irrational behaviors that result in
cognitive biases (e.g., confirmation bias) [12, 13]; and
new adaptive and personalized theories that increase
attacker’s compliance are possible through cognitive
modeling and human-in-the-loop experiments [10]. Our
research framework proposes how experimental games
of increased complexity and cognitive models that
represent human behavior contribute to the generation
of adaptive and personalized deception strategies.

2.

A Research Framework for the Design
of Dynamic, Adaptive, and
Personalized Deception

The goal of our research program is to provide
personalized, dynamic and adaptive deception
algorithms for effective and agile defense capabilities.
Our approach shown in Figure 1 uses an innovative
combination of SSG algorithms for distribution of
limited defense resources, optimization methods
from game-theory and signaling theory (e.g., SSE),
experimentation with human-in-the-loop interactive
security games, and adaptive cognitive modeling using
Instance-Based Learning Theory [22].
A defender allocates resources in an interactive
computer game according to a policy defined by the
optimization algorithms (e.g., SSE). Then, a human
attacker makes decisions over multiple rounds about
surveillance and attack of available targets. A signaling
scheme is defined either independently or dependently
over the allocation algorithm to optimize the frequency

of deceptive and truthful signals sent to the attacker. A
deceptive signal provides information that modifies the
ground truth. The attacker observes the signal and then
decides whether to proceed or not with the attack.
We contribute to the line of SSG research, by (1)
providing insights from human experiments regarding
human trust to signals that are deceptive and truthful
and (2) creating cognitive models that represent the
decisions made by would-be human attackers that
can inform the algorithms for allocation of defense
resources.

2.1.

Experimental Games: Scaling up
Complexity

To demonstrate applicable dynamic and
personalized deception strategies, we rely on interactive
security games to investigate basic principles of
deception across increasing levels of complexity
and realism of the games. The interactive security
games presented in Figure 2 are representative of
key dimensions that guide deception against human
attackers (see section 3). Through the analyses of human
actions across these games, we identify cognitive biases
that can be exploited in deception operations and how
those biases can be modeled computationally. In what
follows we summarize the major insights from current
experimental work in each of these 4 exemplar games.
2.1.1. Box Game. The Box Game (Figure 2a)
is a simple, 2-stage, 2-alternative SSG. In stage 1,
a defender allocates resources to one of two boxes
with 0.5 probability according to the optimal resource
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Figure 2. Different levels of sophistication in interactive security games

allocation SSE algorithm (i.e., pure strategy) [16]. In
stage 2, the defender sends a signal to influence the
attackers decision making to her benefit by exploiting
the fact that the attacker is unaware of the pure strategy
at any given time.
Each round of the two-stage game formalized in [10]
plays out as follows: (1) The defender allocates her
resources (i.e., a ”treasure” of 100 points) covering a
random subset of the targets based on her mixed strategy
(probability of 0.5); (2) The attacker chooses a target, t,
to attack accordingly; (3) The defender sends a (possibly
deceptive) signal to the attacker regarding the current
protection status of t; (4) Based on the information given
in the signal, the attacker chooses to either continue
attacking or withdraw his attack. If the attacker attacks
and the node is protected, the attacker looses 50 points,
if the node is not protected, the attacker gains 100 points.
If the attacker withdraws the attack, it yields 0 points.
Our goal is to find out how humans acting
as ”attackers” (i.e., treasure hunters) behave under
various frequencies of deceptive signals. In other
words, the question is how often should a defender
send a deceptive signal in order to gain the most
benefit? A recent (unpublished) study manipulated
the frequency of sending a truthful signal when the
node is protected (1, 0.75, 0.5) and the type of signal
sent (positive or negative frame). This probability
also controls the proportion of truthful or deceptive
signals for unprotected nodes according to the procedure
formalized in [10]. We found that, overall, the signaling
scheme has no effect on attacks to unprotected nodes;
however, as the frequency of a truthful signal for
protected nodes decreased, the proportion of attacks
on protected nodes increased. Signaling increased the
attackers losses in protected nodes, while there was no
significant increase in the attackers gains from attacks to

unprotected nodes. We also found that deceptive signals
generate less attacks than truthful signals. Furthermore,
positive (i.e., hopeful) signals produce more attacks
when they are truthful than deceptive. The negative (i.e.,
”suspicious”) signals cause more deterrence compare to
positive signals.
2.1.2. Insider Attack Game. The Insider Attack
Game (IAG) (Figure 2b) is an escalation of the box
game as it increases the number of nodes to six, and
adds more contextual information on the nodes (e.g.,
gains and losses, and probabilities of coverage) [11].
The allocation of defense resources is more complicated
as only two out of the six nodes can be protected at a
time. The attacker has access to the abstract information
about the node i.e., value of each node, losses if the
node is protected and probability information about each
node being protected. As an example, the IAG has
been used to test the signaling strategy for deception in
a cybersecurity scenario where the participants play a
role of an attacker (a company’s employee) who tries
to attack the computers to gain points. The company
has six computers and only two security defenders to
monitor these computers. The defenders could only
protect two computers at a time. To secure more
computers, we use signaling to send warnings to deceive
attackers [10]. In each trial, the player analyzes the
information on each node and selects a computer to
attack. They may receive a signal from the defender
and then decide whether to proceed with the attack or
withdraw it. The signaling algorithm used determines
whether to send a truthful signal or a deceptive signal.
[10] suggested that instead of using an exact proportion
of deceptive or truthful signals, ”Goldilocks” zones
works better: the algorithm that sends least proportion
of signals achieves the lower proportion of attacks.
However, the proportion of attacks increase to almost
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95% when there is no signal. This result suggests, as
cognitive science would predict, that human behavior is
dynamic and adaptable, and having one static proportion
of signaling will ultimately be ineffective if it does not
adapt to the attacker actions. Using cognitive models
that emulate the attacker’s actions, we have developed
adaptive and personalized signaling schemes that learn
about attacker’s actions and adjust signals accordingly
[12]. An adaptive signaling scheme starts by sending
truthful signals to the attacker (i.e., to gain trust), then,
according to the attacker’s level of trust, the algorithm
adapts to whether the next signal should be a truthful or
deceptive. We demonstrate how this scheme reduces the
probability of attack, although at the expense of giving
up more attacks in the first few trials [13]. Current work
is ongoing to advance on these insights.
2.1.3. HackIT Game. HackIT (Figure 2c) is
a generic web-based framework for cybersecurity to
study human learning and decision-making of attackers
and defenders [23]. HackIT advances the IAG by
including more semantic information such as network
nodes, representing the characteristics of real nodes;
deception tactics: masking, decoying; and commands,
which are used for communication with the network.
The defender protects the real nodes using deception
tactics and the attacker’s goal is to identify the real
network nodes and exploit them. In HackIT, the
attacker gathers information (pull information) such as
operating systems, open and closed ports, services on
the network nodes, and vulnerabilities from the network
using probing action. Attackers could communicate
with the network in HackIT using tools such as nmap
and gain information about network nodes, topologies
and configurations. However, attackers are not aware
of the strategies used by defenders and they must learn
those strategies overtime by playing different rounds.
HackIT has the potential to simulate many
real-world dynamic situations in the laboratory:
manipulating deception tactic (e.g., decoying and
masking); frequency of deceptive signals (e.g., using
different proportion of honeypots in the network
or testing optimal placement of honeypots); and
manipulating the content of the signal (e.g. use different
configurations of honeypots).
A recent (unpublished) study, builds on insights
from Achleitner et al. (2016). They simulated the
following reconnaissance strategies in deceptive and
non-deceptive networks: Uniform Scanning, Local
Preference Scanning, Preference Sequential Scanning,
Non-Preference Sequential Scanning and Preference
Parallel Scanning. Using HackIT, we are investigating
whether humans exhibit behavior described by these
strategies while probing. In order to do this, we first

simulated a network of 40 computers in two network
topologies: RDS (Reconnaissance deceptive server) and
Non-RDS. Out of 40 computers, only 25% of the hosts
were real while the remaining hosts were honeypots.
In a RDS topology only a subset of nodes are visible
to the attackers and other computers are only visible
after they exploit any computer at the first layer. This
provides a deceptive view of the network which would
be different from each node they exploit. In a Non-RDS
configuration all nodes are connected to a single central
host. The hosts in the Non-RDS configuration can
easily be exploited if the central host in the network
is compromised. The goal of a simulated attacker is to
maximize the number of real systems exploited during a
fixed time. Our current results suggests that the real host
detection rate in the RDS topology was lower than the
on in the Non-RDS topology. Preliminary results of an
on-going experimental study including 18 participants
(6 in each condition), suggest a humans follow a uniform
scanning strategy in both conditions. The number of real
systems exploited were higher in the non-RDS condition
than in the RDS, suggesting that hiding real computers
in a layered network configuration (RDS) reduces the
probability of exploitation.
2.1.4.
CyberVAN. CyberVAN (Figure 2d) is
a security testbed build on top of Virtual Ad
hoc Network (VAN) for cybersecurity research
[24]. CyberVAN is capable of speedy creation of
high-fidelity strategic and tactical network scenarios
using virtual machines, simulated networks, physical
nodes and physical networks. These scenarios could
be controlled by either GUI or commands on a
console. CyberVAN is capable of generating realistic
cyber experimentation environments which includes
the simulated cyberattacks, cyberdefense, providing
synthetic users for creating realistic network traffic
and creating human-in-the-loop environments for
validating various defense algorithms. Specifically,
for cyberdeception experiments, CyberVAN can
provide different deception tactics such as masking (by
hiding/faking the configuration of nodes) and decoying
(by using honeypots, honeynets, honeytokens etc.). The
information manipulated for creating deception includes
network structure, number of nodes in the network,
operating system, ports, services, vulnerabilities,
network round trip time, network traffic etc. The
proportion of deception could be controlled using
different defense algorithms which could be integrated
in CyberVAN. Attackers could interact with virtual
machines using various network scanning tools (e.g.
nmap) to gather information during a probing phase.
As an example, we are using CyberVAN in an
ongoing experiment where we test the effectiveness of
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an optimal masking strategy against random masking
strategy in reducing the utility of attackers. True
configurations (TC) of virtual machines are masked to
a fake observable configuration (OC). The configuration
of virtual machines are different in each round and
participants are able to attack only one machine in every
round. This scenario is presented to human participants
who probe the machines to gather information (e.g.,
operating systems, ports, services). Once attackers
explore the network and learn the features of network
(some of them were masked), they decide what machine
to attack and what type of exploit to use.
An ongoing experiment consists of 6 rounds (1
practice round and 5 actual rounds) and each round
consists of 12 virtual machines. We expect that
attackers would likely choose medium utility nodes for
attack. Also, given insights from the other interactive
security games, we expect that attackers may be naive
or more experienced. A naive attacker would attack
based on fixed preference of OCs, but an experienced
attacker would utilize the information about probability
distribution of TCs being mapped to OCs. Overall,
we expect that the optimal masking strategy would be
helpful to improve defenders utility compared to the
random masking strategy.

2.2.

Cognitive Models of Attacker Behavior

In addressing unrealistic assumptions of attacker’s
rationality in SSE, researchers have used models
from behavioral economics; including Quantal
response and Subjective Utility Quantal response
[25].
Although these models are common and
well-known for their statistical properties that reflect
human choices, these are not process models: they
cannot explain the cognitive mechanisms by which
humans make decisions, presenting many limitations
to design dynamic, adaptive technologies that support
cyberdefense processes, such as those involved in the
new signaling schemes [26].
Cognitive models are dynamic and adaptable
computational representations of the cognitive
structures and mechanisms involved in cognitive
tasks such as processing information for decision
making. Cognitive modeling technologies rely on
attention, memory, and decision making theories, that
allow for the construction of generative models to be
eventually tested against behavioral, physiological,
or neural data. The advantage of cognitive models
resides in their ability to dynamically learn from
experience, to adjust to new inputs, environments, and
tasks in similar ways as humans do, and to predict
performance in situations that haven’t been encountered

and for which data is not yet available [26, 22]. In this
regard, cognitive models differ from purely statistical
approaches, such as machine learning, that are often
capable of evaluating only stable, long-term sequential
dependencies from existing data but fail to account for
the dynamics of human cognition and human adaptation
to novel situations.
We developed cognitive models to replicate the
attacker’s actions in the presence or absence of signals
in three SSGs: the Box Game, the Insider Attack Game,
and the HackIT game. We have not yet developed
cognitive models for CyberVan, but we expect that the
same general approach that we have followed for the
other SSGs will apply to our current work in CyberVan.
Our cognitive models aim at turning static deception
strategies into dynamic and personalized deception. Our
cognitive models of an individual opponent rely on the
theoretical principles defined in IBLT [22], which state
that humans make decisions from experience according
to the similarity, frequency and recency of experienced
events and the value of the actions taken (i.e., their
utility).
Cognitive models and the major insights in the
SSGs have been reported in various recent publications
[11, 12, 13]. From the results of the cognitive models
compared to human behavior in the SSGs, we have
learned that: (1) humans behave far differently than
predicted under the assumption of perfect rationality
[17, 11]; (2) humans exhibit nominally irrational
behaviors (e.g., confirmation bias) that reflect capacity
and information limitations and the need to resort
to heuristic strategies; and that (3) while signaling
algorithms optimized for perfectly rational adversaries
do improve defense compared to not signaling at all
[16], they are less effective than expected for boundedly
rational humans [10].
In our current work [13] we improved upon
traditional game-theoretic signaling schemes (the peSSE
signaling scheme [10] by developing a cognitive
signaling scheme that is adaptive and based on cognitive
principles.
The cognitive model predicts human
decisions are made by aggregated retrieval across past
experiences based on the similarity to the current
situation as predicted by IBLT [22]. From this recent
work we observe that: (1) human decisions are strongly
influenced by confirmation bias, and (2) it is important
to consider the dynamics of signal in the individual
decisions: Continued attacks given truthful signals
strengthen the expectation of a loss given a signal. This
and other a potential strategies of defense need to be
investigated further, to determine how to maintain the
compliance to the signals to the benefit of the defender.
In general, our current work has outlined an initial
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approach to deceptive signaling for cyberdefense that
relies on cognitive models of attacker behavior to
balance the rate of deception in an attempt to keep the
attacker’s belief in the signal high. Importantly, our
cognitive signaling scheme is adaptive and personalized,
and can therefore be used to induce biases and
influence attackers to comply with the signal beyond the
capabilities of any static scheme.

3.

Key Dimensions for the Design of
Dynamic and Personalized
Cyberdefense

A recent review of the literature regarding deception
in cybersecurity proposes a taxonomy of the types of
deception that correspond to the game-theoretic notions
of private information, actors, actions, and duration [27].
The authors use these game-theoretic notions to describe
a set of 6 types of deception: perturbation, moving target
defense, obfuscation, mixing, honey-x, and attacker
engagement. Perturbation refers the application of
noise in the information itself. Moving target defense
refers to the idea of changing attack surfaces and
creating random configurations; for example, by using
mixed strategies. Obfuscation, refers to hiding valuable
information using external noise; for example, deceptive
routing of traffic. Mixing, relates to a technique of
hiding valuable information in an attempt to make
the entry and exit nodes unlinkable. Honey-x, refers
to deception which uses common techniques such as
honeypot, honeynet, honeybot, etc. Finally, attacker
engagement refers to multi-period, dynamic games in
which deception techniques must be adapted to the
actions of the attacker.
In this section, we concentrate on the attacker
engagement dimension proposed by [27]. Specifically,
we propose a set dimensions for the design of dynamic
and personalized deception derived from our own results
from experimentation and modeling connected to the
interactive SSGs reviewed above. We present three
major dimensions of deception defenses in attacker
engagement in dynamic SSGs: (1) Deception tactic; (2)
Signaling strategy; (3) Interaction mechanisms.
Deception Tactics. Traditional security defense
tactics are often static and reactive: a defender
monitors network traffic and uses technology for
intrusion detection that supports the detection of
cyber-attacks. A recent data breach investigation report
suggest this form of defense is highly unsuccessful, as
only a low percentage of breaches are detected [28].
Deception-based tactics of defense can provide many
advantages over traditional methods [7, 3]: they can
induce attackers to take actions that benefit defenders.

In our current work with SSGs, we demonstrate the
use of two deception tactics in over multiple periods in
cybersecurity games: Masking and Decoying. Table
1 summarizes the way these two deception tactics are
being used in our four examples of SSGs. Masking
has been used to hide the facts about the reality (e.g.,
A defender can mask vulnerabilities to showcase that
the computer is secure). For example, before even
implementing the real defense, a defender could mask
the Server Message Block service version to showcase
it is patched and secure the network from WannaCry
ransomware attack. We also use mimicking where
software and services may imitate the ground truth [21].
The intention is to showcase a system more or less
valuable to the attacker. For example, a system may
respond as if it is running a version of Windows XP
while actually running Windows 7 [4].
Table 1: Deception Tactics in different interactive
cybersecurity games

A decoy tactic is another popular concept used by
defenders to identify attackers, gather information about
their techniques and for securing the real network by
luring hackers into the honeypots [29]. Honeypots,
honeynets and honeytokens are examples of decoy
deception tactic. A honeytoken could be a record in the
database which is not relevant to any database user. Any
access to such record would suggest a malicious user
and defender could investigate this user. Honeytokens
are a honey thing in a normal or honeypot system.
Signaling Strategy. Signaling theory addresses a
fundamental problem in the communication between
a sender (the signaler) and a receiver: whether the
sender’s message is conveying the truth or manipulating
the information to her benefit [30]. Signaling has been
used in SSGs in a way that it is incentive-compatible for
a sender to transmit a message that partially reveals her
private information, since the receiver cannot know the
underlying information with certainty [27].
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Table 2: Signaling Strategy in different interactive cybersecurity games

In the context of cybersecurity, attackers may
gather information from scanning nodes in the
network (i.e., ”pull information”); but also, defenders
may strategically use signals to provide deceptive
information to the attacker (i.e., ”push information”).
The goal is to waste attackers’ resources and time and
lead them to ”the light,” revealing their intentions and
identity. As discussed above, we have investigated
signaling strategies in SSGs, where these strategies
essentially identify a proportion of times in which
a deceptive signal could be sent from the defender
to the attacker (e.g., how often to say that an
unprotected node is protected or say that a protected
node is unprotected). Research regarding signaling is
a promising current area of research in SSGs [17, 16].
However, a methodical cognitive approach is required
to experimentally investigate the dimensions important
for signaling in SSGs.
Deceptive warning messages or explicit information
such as network structure, number of nodes in the
network, operating systems, ports, services, network
traffic, round trip time information, and unpatched
vulnerabilities in the network could all be used by the
defender to deceive the attacker. Here, we consider three
relevant dimensions for the investigation of signaling in
SSGs: (1) The frequency of deceptive signals, (2) the
level of information revealed to the attacker, and (3)
the type of signal and content of the signal. Table 2
summarizes the way these three signaling strategies are
being used in our four examples of SSGs.
The frequency of deceptive signals is a common
theme of current research in SSGs, however current
algorithms optimizing the signal frequency are less
successful than expected [17, 16]. The reason is
that humans are not rational, they learn from their

experience, and they adapt accordingly. For example,
if the defender deceives too frequently, the attacker
will get to learn this tendency making the defense
strategy astray. Generally, any non-adaptive algorithm
of defense will tend to be ineffective against human
attackers, and SSG researchers believe that there is a
Goldilocks Zone, an optimal level of deception that
could be more effective to improve the attacker’s
compliance in cybersecurity games [10]. In our current
work our cognitive models of attacker’s behavior helps
to inform the development of adaptive and personalized
signaling algorithms in cyberdefense [12, 13], although
the effectiveness of all these algorithms needs to be
tested empirically.
Addressing different forms of uncertainty is one
of the major current challenges in SSG research
[18]. The amount of information provided in a signal
can influence the effectiveness of the deception and
ultimately the actions an attacker can take. A common
assumption in SSG research is that an attacker and
a defender have perfect information about the state
of the world: the payoff matrix and the opponents’
strategies (e.g. probabilities for choosing available
options) [18]. However, in naturalistic tasks this is an
unreasonable assumption. Past research of behavioral
game theory has addressed the effects of information
in traditional social dilemmas [31]; but research should
systematically experiment with uncertainty levels in
SSGs in the context of cybersecurity: revealing more
or less information in the signals sent to the attacker to
determine their effectiveness on deterring attacks.
In addressing the effectiveness of deceptive signals,
the content of the signals must also influence how
the attacker reacts to the information. For example,
the polarity of a message (i.e., presented as positive
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Table 3: Interaction Mechanism in different interactive cybersecurity games

or negative) may greatly influence how attackers react
to the signal. Consider for example, the well-known
human bias called the framing effect [32]. Regardless
of choice options being of equal expected values, the
frame will elicit systematically different choices when
presented as gains or losses. This robust human bias can
be used in the design of content of signals that could
deter or encourage the attacker’s actions. As alluded to
earlier we have observed such asymmetric effects in a
simple binary choice task (e.g., the ”box game”).
Interaction Mechanisms. An attacker interacts
with a network to gather information about the network
structure, number of nodes in the network, their
configuration, protocols and unpatched vulnerabilities,
by passively or actively probing the network [7]. Active
and passive probing leaves information about attackers
in the network which could be used by defenders to
learn about attackers and improve their defense based
on the attackers activities. Table 3 summarizes the way
in which interaction mechanisms are being used in our
four examples of SSGs; the interaction of attacker and
defender could happen in three ways:(1) probing, where
defender already used deception tactics and the attacker
gather information about the network before attack; (2)
adaptive, as attackers communicate with the network
through his probing and attack actions, defender adapts
the deception or the resource allocation strategy [33];
(3) personalized, a powerful defender may generate
personalized signals or network configuration based on
attackers activities in the network.

4.

Conclusion

Our research program on cyberdeception contributes
to elucidating ways to use deceptive signals in SSGs in

the context of dynamic and personalized cyberdefense.
We contribute to SSG research program, by providing
insights from human experiments regarding human trust
to truthful or deceptive signals, and creating cognitive
models that represent the decisions made by would-be
human attackers that can inform the algorithms for
allocation of defense resources.
Across four levels of complexity in interactive
security games and using the insights of cognitive
models of attacker behavior, we find that: (1) signaling
algorithms optimized for perfectly rational attackers
improve defense compared to no signaling at all; (2)
humans behave far differently than predicted under
the assumption of perfect rationality [17]; (3) humans
exhibit nominally irrational behaviors that result in
cognitive biases (e.g., confirmation bias) [12, 13]; and
(4) new adaptive and personalized theories that increase
attacker’s compliance are possible through cognitive
modeling and human-in-the-loop experiments [10].
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